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Search Results (10111 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: capture fast-RX rate before mesh reuses skb->cb ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() reads RX status through IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), which aliases the same skb->cb storage that ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() reuses as IEEE80211_TX_INFO. In the unicast forward path, mesh_data does: info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(fwd_skb); memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); on the same skb the caller still names via rx->skb, then either queues the skb for TX (success) or kfree_skb()'s it (no-route) before returning RX_QUEUED. The caller's RX_QUEUED arm then calls sta_stats_encode_rate(status) on memory that is either zeroed (success path) or freed (no-route path). The latter is KASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle. Fix by encoding the rate from status before invoking ieee80211_rx_mesh_data(), so the RX_QUEUED arm consumes a value captured while status was still backed by valid memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53401 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: omap2: fix use-after-free in omapfb_mmap omapfb_mmap() has a race condition with OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE ioctl that can lead to use-after-free: The fb_mmap() entry point holds mm_lock but not lock (fb_info->lock), while ioctl handlers like OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE hold lock but not mm_lock. This allows concurrent execution. In omapfb_mmap(): 1. rg = omapfb_get_mem_region(ofbi->region); // Get old region ref 2. start = omapfb_get_region_paddr(ofbi); // Read from NEW region 3. len = fix->smem_len; // Read from NEW region 4. vm_iomap_memory(vma, start, len); // Map NEW region memory 5. atomic_inc(&rg->map_count); // Increment OLD region! Concurrently, OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE can: - Reassign ofbi->region = new_rg - Update fix->smem_len - OMAPFB_SETUP_MEM then checks NEW region's map_count (0!) and frees it This leaves userspace with a mapping to freed physical memory. The fix is to read all required values (start, len) from the same region reference (rg) that will have its map_count incremented, preventing the region from being freed while still mapped. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53025 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: greybus: raw: fix use-after-free on cdev close This addresses a use-after-free bug when a raw bundle is disconnected but its chardev is still opened by an application. When the application releases the cdev, it causes the following panic when init on free is enabled (CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y): refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 139 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd0/0x130 ... Call Trace: <TASK> cdev_put+0x18/0x30 __fput+0x255/0x2a0 __x64_sys_close+0x3d/0x80 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The cdev is contained in the "gb_raw" structure, which is freed in the disconnect operation. When the cdev is released at a later time, cdev_put gets an address that points to freed memory. To fix this use-after-free, convert the struct device from a pointer to being embedded, that makes the lifetime of the cdev and of this device the same. Then, use cdev_device_add, which guarantees that the device won't be released until all references to the cdev have been released. Finally, delegate the freeing of the structure to the device release function, instead of freeing immediately in the disconnect callback. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53009 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: fix double-free of tx_buf skb If ice_tso() or ice_tx_csum() fail, the error path in ice_xmit_frame_ring() frees the skb, but the 'first' tx_buf still points to it and is marked as valid (ICE_TX_BUF_SKB). 'next_to_use' remains unchanged, so the potential problem will likely fix itself when the next packet is transmitted and the tx_buf gets overwritten. But if there is no next packet and the interface is brought down instead, ice_clean_tx_ring() -> ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf() will find the tx_buf and free the skb for the second time. The fix is to reset the tx_buf type to ICE_TX_BUF_EMPTY in the error path, so that ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf(). Move the initialization of 'first' up, to ensure it's already valid in case we hit the linearization error path. The bug was spotted by AI while I had it looking for something else. It also proposed an initial version of the patch. I reproduced the bug and tested the fix by adding code to inject failures, on a build with KASAN. I looked for similar bugs in related Intel drivers and did not find any. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46330 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Revert "net/smc: Introduce TCP ULP support" This reverts commit d7cd421da9da2cc7b4d25b8537f66db5c8331c40. As reported by Al Viro, the TCP ULP support for SMC is fundamentally broken. The implementation attempts to convert an active TCP socket into an SMC socket by modifying the underlying `struct file`, dentry, and inode in-place, which violates core VFS invariants that assume these structures are immutable for an open file, creating a risk of use after free errors and general system instability. Given the severity of this design flaw and the fact that cleaner alternatives (e.g., LD_PRELOAD, BPF) exist for legacy application transparency, the correct course of action is to remove this feature entirely. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46210 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: iris: fix use-after-free of fmt_src during MBPF check During concurrency testing, multiple instances can run in parallel, and each instance uses its own inst->lock while the core->lock protects the list of active instances. The race happens because these locks cover different scopes, inst->lock protects only the internals of a single instance, while the Macro Blocks Per Frame (MBPF) checker walks the core list under core->lock and reads fields like fmt_src->width and fmt_src->height. At the same time, iris_close() may free fmt_src and fmt_dst under inst->lock while the instance is still present in the core list. This allows a situation where the MBPF checker, still iterating through the core list, reaches an instance whose fmt_src was already freed by another thread and ends up dereferencing a dangling pointer, resulting in a use-after-free. This happens because the MBPF checker assumes that any instance in the core list is fully valid, but the freeing of fmt_src and fmt_dst without removing the instance from the core list is not correct. The correct ordering is to defer freeing fmt_src and fmt_dst until after the instance has been removed from the core list and all teardown under the core lock has completed, ensuring that no dangling pointers are ever exposed during MBPF checks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31501 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ti: icssg-prueth: fix use-after-free of CPPI descriptor in RX path cppi5_hdesc_get_psdata() returns a pointer into the CPPI descriptor. In both emac_rx_packet() and emac_rx_packet_zc(), the descriptor is freed via k3_cppi_desc_pool_free() before the psdata pointer is used by emac_rx_timestamp(), which dereferences psdata[0] and psdata[1]. This constitutes a use-after-free on every received packet that goes through the timestamp path. Defer the descriptor free until after all accesses through the psdata pointer are complete. For emac_rx_packet(), move the free into the requeue label so both early-exit and success paths free the descriptor after all accesses are done. For emac_rx_packet_zc(), move the free to the end of the loop body after emac_dispatch_skb_zc() (which calls emac_rx_timestamp()) has returned. | ||||
| CVE-2026-50215 | 2026-10-15 | 4.4 Medium | ||
| A use-after-free exists in the Windows WFP packet-capture driver shipped with Akamai Guardicore Platform Agent (GPA) before 7.4. When an IPv6 proxy/redirect rule is active, a local attacker with Administrator privileges can send a single crafted outbound IPv6 packet via a raw IPV6_HDRINCL socket to trigger this at DISPATCH_LEVEL, resulting in an immediate system crash. | ||||
| CVE-2026-50217 | 2026-10-15 | 4.7 Medium | ||
| A use-after-free vulnerability in the Windows WFP callout driver of Akamai Guardicore Platform Agent (GPA) allows a local low-privileged user to cause a denial of service (system crash / BSOD) via an outbound ICMPv6 packet containing an IPv6 Hop-by-Hop extension header. When the IPv6 ICMP redirect policy is active, the packet is copied into a buffer that is freed but subsequently passed to a downstream filter. The size of the freed allocation is attacker-controlled (via packet length), enabling kernel pool grooming. Exploitation requires that the non-default IPv6 ICMP capture/redirect policy is enabled for the endpoint. | ||||
| CVE-2026-58099 | 2026-10-15 | N/A | ||
| When copying knotes from a parent kqueue to a child, the copy code did not correctly exclude marker knotes (used internally to track list traversal position) before marking them as in-flux and releasing the kqueue lock. If another thread freed a marker while the lock was dropped, the subsequent in-flux decrement operated on freed memory. An unprivileged local user may be able to exploit these races to escalate privileges. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98398 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: locking/lockdep: Invalidate stale class_cache entries for zapped classes syzbot reported a lockdep splat hitting DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1) in hlock_class() due to an invalid class_idx: WARNING: kernel/locking/lockdep.c:238 at __lock_acquire+0x382/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5203 Workqueue: wg-crypt-wg0 wg_packet_tx_worker RIP: 0010:hlock_class kernel/locking/lockdep.c:238 [inline] RIP: 0010:check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4870 [inline] RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x389/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5203 Call Trace: <IRQ> lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5886 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:173 tcp_tsq_handler+0x29/0x200 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1291 tcp_tsq_workfn+0x384/0x410 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1325 ... When a lock class is zapped (e.g. during module unload or key unregistration), zap_class() clears the class's bit in lock_classes_in_use and removes it from the class hash table. However, existing lockdep_map instances embedded in data structures may still retain a pointer to the zapped class in their class_cache[] array. When __lock_acquire() subsequently runs on such a lock, it finds lock->class_cache[subclass] != NULL, skipping register_lock_class() and assigning hlock->class_idx to the index of the zapped class. When check_wait_context() or hlock_class() inspects the held_lock, it finds !test_bit(class_idx, lock_classes_in_use) and warns. Furthermore, if the zapped slot is subsequently re-allocated to an unrelated lock key, the stale class_cache entry would erroneously match the unrelated class (ABA issue). Add lock_class_cache_is_valid() to validate that the cached class is within lock_classes bounds, still allocated in lock_classes_in_use (using uninstrumented arch_test_bit() in __always_inline context so it is safe in noinstr contexts like match_held_lock()), and that class->key matches the expected subkey (taking lockdep_set_subclass() overrides into account). Also use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() when accessing class_cache[]. If the entry is invalid or stale, fall back to register_lock_class() / look_up_lock_class(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98391 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Guard page-fault worker with runtime PM check During VM teardown, the VM's runtime PM reference is dropped asynchronously, allowing the device to autosuspend while stale page faults belonging to the now-dead VM are still queued. When the page-fault worker later tries to ack one of these, it calls into guc_ct_send_locked() on an already-suspended device, tripping: Assertion `!xe_pm_runtime_suspended(xe)` failed! WARNING at xe_device.c:1267 xe_device_assert_mem_access+0x11c/0x140 [xe] A live VM/exec queue always holds a PM reference while it has outstanding work, so if the device is suspended at ack time, the owning context is already gone and the fault is stale. Take a runtime PM reference across the entire pagefault queue worker to safely deliver acks for torn-down VMs. v3: - Move PM ref to the generic xe_pagefault_queue_work using guard(xe_pm_runtime)(xe) instead of tracking it in the GuC backend(Matt Brost). v2: - Hold PM ref across the entire batch (begin/end) instead of per-ack. This prevents the device from autosuspending mid-batch, which would leave write_only acks written but the end flush skipped, and skip counter++, desyncing the cadence check.(Himal) - Add a comment explaining stale faults.(Himal) (cherry picked from commit fcc2431d2213dc4d04250c4f1ae87d9c3ae0d455) [Rodrigo: Added xe_device struct for compatibility while cherry-picking] | ||||
| CVE-2026-98428 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb: 6fire: Avoid embedded URBs The USB 6fire driver uses URBs embedded in different structs for PCM, MIDI and communication, and this is basically a buggy implementation nowadays; since a URB is managed with a refcount, this may lead to a UAF when the URB is released asynchronously. For addressing the problem, this patch converts those embedded URBs to ones that are properly allocated via usb_alloc_urb(). The pcm_urb.packets[] is gone, as it's allocated by usb_alloc_urb(), hence it's found in urb.iso_frame_desc[] instead. The conversions are rather straightforward; each embedded struct urb is changed to a pointer, and its callers are updated accordingly. The resource for those structs are released in the common destructor functions (usb6fire_comm_free(), etc), which are called at both the init error path and the disconnect. No functional changes, only compile-tested. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98415 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: soc: samsung: exynos-pmu: fix use-after-free of interrupt generator node The setup_cpuhp_and_cpuidle() parses the device tree node for the interrupt generation block via of_parse_phandle() and decrements its reference count using of_node_put() immediately after fetching the resource address. However, later the intr_gen_node pointer is passed into of_syscon_register_regmap(). Fix this by declaring intr_gen_node with __free() and removing of_node_put(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-109718 | 1 Mozilla | 2 Firefox, Thunderbird | 2026-10-15 | 5.4 Medium |
| Use-after-free in the XML component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 158, Firefox ESR 115.43, Firefox ESR 153.5, Thunderbird 158, and Thunderbird 153.5. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98429 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/efa: Keep EQ resources alive while IRQ is registered The completion IRQ handler accesses the EQ state and DMA buffer. Its IRQ was registered before that state was initialized, while teardown released the buffer before free_irq() synchronized the handler. Initialize the EQ without arming it, register the IRQ, and then arm it. Reverse the resource order during teardown by freeing the IRQ before destroying the EQ. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98430 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/efa: Keep admin queues alive while IRQ is registered The management IRQ handler accesses both the admin completion queue and the async event queue. The driver registered the IRQ before constructing these queues and destroyed them before freeing the IRQ, so the handler's lifetime was not contained by the resources it accesses. Initialize the queues with interrupts masked, request the IRQ, and then switch to interrupt mode. On removal, reset the device and free the IRQ before destroying the queues. Also reset the device before destroying the queues if IRQ registration fails, because the device already has their DMA addresses. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64423 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's multicast hash table (mc_hash). Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is accessing it, a use-after-free occurs. Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90 print_report+0x175/0x7c0 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 do_softirq+0x57/0x80 </IRQ> Allocated by task 2239: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-53275 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: mcast: Fix use-after-free when processing MLD queries When processing an MLD query, a pointer to the multicast group address is retrieved when initially parsing the packet. This pointer is later dereferenced without being reloaded despite the fact that the skb header might have been reallocated following the pskb_may_pull() calls, leading to a use-after-free [1]. Fix by copying the multicast group address when the packet is initially parsed. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881154b8e90 by task kworker/4:1/118 Workqueue: mld mld_query_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512) mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) </TASK> [...] Freed by task 118: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:57) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:78) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285) kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:6251 mm/slub.c:6566) pskb_expand_head (net/core/skbuff.c:2335) __pskb_pull_tail (net/core/skbuff.c:2878 (discriminator 4)) __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1495 (discriminator 1)) mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) | ||||
| CVE-2026-53264 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_api: use RCU with deferred freeing for action lifecycle When NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER are run concurrently it is possible to create a race with an associated action. Let's illustrate with CPU0 running NEWTFILTER and CPU1 running DELFILTER: 0: mutex_lock() <-- holds the idr lock 0: rcu_read_lock() 0: p = idr_find(idr, index) <-- action p is valid (RCU protects IDR) 0: mutex_unlock() <-- releases the idr lock 1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held 1: idr_remove(idr, index) <-- Action removed from IDR 1: mutex_unlock() <-- mutex released allowing us to delete the action 1: tcf_action_cleanup(p); kfree(p) <-- Kfrees p immediately, no deferral 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- ouch, UAF p points to freed memory This patch fixes the race condition between NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER by adding struct rcu_head to tc_action used in the deferral and introducing a call_rcu() in the delete path to defer the final kfree(). Note: this is a revert of commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu") but also modernization/simplification to directly use kfree_rcu(). Let's illustrate the new restored code path: 0: rcu_read_lock() 1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held 1: idr_remove(idr, index) 1: mutex_unlock() 1: call_rcu(&p->tcfa_rcu, tcf_action_rcu_free) <-- defer kfree after grace period 0: p = idr_find(idr, index) 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- fails, refcnt already 0 1: rcu_read_unlock() <-- release so freeing can run after grace period After CPU1 calls idr_remove(), the object is no longer reachable through the IDR. CPU0's subsequent idr_find() will return NULL, and even if it still held a stale pointer, the immediate kfree() is now deferred until after the RCU grace period, so no UAF can occur. | ||||