Export limit exceeded: 409278 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Export limit exceeded: 409278 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (409278 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-80527 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD` from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`. If the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS after `cap->mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read caps. In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need <= mds_wanted` and returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`. If the cap update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after `cap->mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to wake it up. The ordering issue is that `cap->mds_wanted` is updated in __prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually queued for send. That makes one field serve two different meanings at once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS already knows it wants. A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS. However, simply moving the `cap->mds_wanted assignment` later would not be sufficient: queueing the message in the messenger does not guarantee that the MDS processed that specific wanted set, and reconnect or message loss can still invalidate that assumption. Fixing that properly would require a larger rework of the cap state machine. To allow simpler backports to stable kernels, this patch implements a simpler workaround: - stop waiting forever in __ceph_get_caps(); after a bounded wait, fall back to the renew path - make ceph_renew_caps() issue a synchronous `OPEN` request whenever the inode still does not actually hold the wanted caps, instead of only calling ceph_check_caps() The extra issued-vs-wanted check in ceph_renew_caps() is necessary because the previous test only checked whether the inode still had any real caps at all. That is not enough after revocation: the client can still hold something like `pLs` and yet be missing `FILE_RD` completely. In that case, falling back to ceph_check_caps() is not sufficient, because it still trusts `cap->mds_wanted` and may resend nothing. By requiring `(issued & wanted) == wanted` before taking the asynchronous path, the code only uses ceph_check_caps() when the `wanted caps` are already actually issued. Otherwise, it sends the synchronous `OPEN` renew. This preserves the existing asynchronous fast path when the wanted caps are already issued, avoids changing cap-state semantics, and fixes the hang by guaranteeing that a stalled waiter eventually retries through a path that does not rely on the stale `mds_wanted` state. [ idryomov: move CEPH_GET_CAPS_WAIT_TIMEOUT from libceph.h to mds_client.h, formatting ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-80522 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: tegra - fix rctx->cryptlen calculation in tegra_gcm_do_one_req() Perform rctx->cryptlen calculation in tegra_gcm_do_one_req() the same way it is done in tegra_ccm_crypt_init(). The current formulae may lead to a crash if a caller does not call tegra_gcm_setauthsize() and so ctx->authsize remains zero. Then a decrypt operation with incorrect rctx->cryptlen will lead to a write beyound rctx->dst_sg buffer. As a follow-up cleanup delete struct tegra_aead_ctx->authsize field since it appears to be completely unused. Also simplify tegra_ccm_setauthsize() and tegra_gcm_setauthsize() functions respectively. | ||||
| CVE-2026-76285 | 1 Splunk | 2 Splunk, Splunk Enterprise | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, Cisco has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-76285 are related to improper adherence to coding standards and are grouped under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) CWE-710. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74753 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Reject exited events as group leaders perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state and detaches their group relationships. The event's file descriptor can remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and DEAD events. A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader. When the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling. The sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event. Reject group leaders in the EXIT state. Perform the check while holding the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach the leader between validation and group attachment. [peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent] | ||||
| CVE-2026-74752 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use When cookie authentication is disabled, COOKIE_ECHO restores fixed-size AUTH fields directly from peer-controlled cookie bytes. A forged RANDOM length, HMAC list, or CHUNKS list can then reach association consumers with lengths or identifiers that were never validated against the local backing arrays. A forged RANDOM length can cause out-of-bounds reads during key-vector construction. A forged HMAC identifier also caused a 32-byte write past a zero-length AUTH chunk, providing a primitive for a local privilege escalation chain. Validate the cookie's RANDOM, HMACS, and CHUNKS parameters at the cookie trust boundary before copying them into the association. Reject invalid types, malformed lengths, unsupported HMAC identifiers, HMAC lists without SHA1, and forbidden chunk ids. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74748 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ipset: fix refcount race between list:set GC and swap __ip_set_put_byindex() resolved the index to a set pointer under RCU, then took ip_set_ref_lock in __ip_set_put() to decrement set->ref. ip_set_swap() holds that same lock while swapping both the ip_set_list slots and the two sets' ref counters, so it can interleave between the dereference and the lock acquisition, leaving the caller to decrement a set whose reference already moved to the other index and hit BUG_ON(set->ref == 0). list_set_gc() reaches this from timer softirq, which the nfnl mutex does not serialize against swap: an expiring list:set member calls list_set_del() -> ip_set_put_byindex() while IPSET_CMD_SWAP runs on the referenced sets. Resolve the index and decrement under ip_set_ref_lock, as ip_set_swap() already does, keeping the refcount tied to the index rather than to a stale set pointer. kernel BUG at net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:685! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:ip_set_put_byindex (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:870) Call Trace: <IRQ> list_set_del (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:159) set_cleanup_entries (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:181) list_set_gc (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:578) call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1748) __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2374) run_timer_softirq (kernel/time/timer.c:2405) </IRQ> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt | ||||
| CVE-2026-74747 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: revalidate ihl to prevent out-of-bounds access While the outer IP header is already pulled into the skb head, we must be careful and revalidate the embedded headers after reading them from the skb frags to prevent out-of-bounds access. One such place reported by Sashiko is ip_vs_nat_icmp() where local process can change the ihl field and after skb_ensure_writable() we can see larger value which is a problem for the ip_send_check(cih) calls. Add check to drop the packet if the ihl field is changed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74746 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: flowtable: publish GC-visible tuple last nf_flow_table_iterate() only treats original-direction tuple nodes as owning entries. Publishing the original node first lets GC observe and free a flow while flow_offload_add() is still inserting the reply node. Publish the reply node first and the original node last so GC never sees a partially installed flow. KASAN can trigger slab-use-after-free read and write reports in the flowtable/rhashtable path (rht_deferred_worker, jhash, flow_offload_del, flow_offload_lookup, etc.). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74745 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eth: bnxt: avoid deadlock when canceling IRQ affinity notifier Unregistering IRQ affinity notifiers waits for the callback synchronously. bnxt takes the netdev instance lock in the notifier (to restart the queue) and cancels the work under the same lock. This may obviously deadlock. Move the restart to the async service task. The queue restart isn't super time sensitive. Store the new TPH tag, schedule the task. Safely canceling the service task is already ironed out. In bnxt_request_irq() the order of registering notifier, affinity and initial TPH programming has to be inverted. I think it was racy previously since user may trigger an update as soon as notifier is installed. There's a small known gap - if pcie_tph_get_cpu_st() fails at init and the target tag is 0 we may miss programming the entry. This does not seem worth fixing, the code has skip-on-failure all over the place, anyway. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74744 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev ipvlan devices inherit hard_header_len from phy_dev during ipvlan_init(), but leave needed_headroom and needed_tailroom set to 0. When the underlying phy_dev (or stacked lower device) requires extra headroom or tailroom for headers/trailers (e.g. macsec, ipsec, wireguard, tunnels, or veth with rx headroom), upper layers calculating packet headroom and tailroom fail to reserve sufficient space. This can result in reallocation overhead, skb headroom underflows, or KASAN slab-use-after-free crashes when dev_hard_header() / ipvlan_hard_header() prepends header data or when lower devices append tailroom. Fix this by: 1. Inheriting needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev in ipvlan_init(). 2. Propagating needed_headroom and needed_tailroom updates to attached ipvlans in ipvlan_device_event() when receiving NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE events. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74743 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev macvlan devices inherit hard_header_len from lowerdev during macvlan_init(), but leave needed_headroom and needed_tailroom set to 0. When the underlying lowerdev requires extra headroom or tailroom for headers/trailers (e.g. macsec, ipsec, wireguard, tunnels, or veth with rx headroom), upper layers calculating packet headroom and tailroom fail to reserve sufficient space. This can result in reallocation overhead, skb headroom underflows, or KASAN slab-use-after-free crashes when dev_hard_header() / macvlan_hard_header() prepends header data or when lower devices append tailroom. Fix this by: 1. Inheriting needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev in macvlan_init(). 2. Propagating needed_headroom and needed_tailroom updates to attached macvlans in macvlan_device_event() when receiving NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE events. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74739 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: skip hash tables in u32_bind_class() u32_walk() enumerates both struct tc_u_hnode and struct tc_u_knode through the walker callback. u32_bind_class() unconditionally casts the passed fh to tc_u_knode and accesses &n->res, so when fh is actually a tc_u_hnode, which has no tcf_result member, this results in a slab-out-of-bounds read of res->classid in tc_cls_bind_class(). The issue can be reproduced with the following commands: tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: hfsc tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 hfsc sc rate 1000kbit tc filter add dev lo parent 1:1 protocol ip prio 1 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:1 tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:2 hfsc sc rate 2000kbit Fix this by skipping hash tables via the TC_U32_KEY(handle) check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74736 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_bpf: reject dev-bound programs bound to a different device cls_bpf_prog_from_efd() obtained a SCHED_CLS program via bpf_prog_get_type_dev() but never verified that a device-bound (offloaded) program's bound netdev matches the TC netdev the classifier is being attached to. This let a program loaded with prog_ifindex for device A be attached via cls_bpf + skip_sw to device B; deleting device A then destroyed the program's offload state while it was still attached to device B, triggering a netdevsim WARN (panic with panic_on_warn=1). Mirror the XDP attach path (net/core/dev.c) and reject the attach with -EINVAL when a dev-bound program's bound device does not match the target device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74733 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: pca953x: fix pca953x_irq_bus_sync_unlock regmap lock Locking is disabled in the regmap config as this driver uses its own lock. This means that all calls to regmap functions (read or write) must hold the i2c_lock. The function pca953x_irq_bus_sync_unlock() did not do this, and it was therefore possible that multiple threads could cause an incorrect register to be read/written. A previous patch partly fixed this, but only protected the write to the interrupt mask register, and not the read from the direction register. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74730 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Pin the 'struct nfs_server' during a FREE_STATEID call Dan Aloni reports that he was able to hit a use-after-free bug if a FREE_STATEID operation gets delayed for whatever reason. Fix this by bumping the refcount of the 'struct nfs_server' object for the duration of the FREE_STATEID so it doesn't get cleaned up from underneath us while operations are still in flight. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74726 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: alb: re-check primary_is_promisc under RTNL in bond_alb_monitor bond_alb_monitor() reads primary_is_promisc under RCU, then drops RCU and takes RTNL via rtnl_trylock() before undoing the promiscuity it set on the active slave. In that window the active slave can change under RTNL (RTM_DELLINK -> __bond_release_one() -> bond_alb_handle_active_change()), which already drops the promiscuity and clears primary_is_promisc. The monitor still acts on the stale decision: if the slave was removed with no failover, curr_active_slave is now NULL and the deref faults; if it failed over, the stale dev_set_promiscuity(-1) underflows the new slave's promiscuity counter and pins it in IFF_PROMISC. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: b42 bond_alb_monitor RIP: 0010:bond_alb_monitor (drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1600) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Re-check primary_is_promisc (and curr_active_slave) after taking RTNL so the monitor only undoes an increment it still owns. The other bonding monitors already re-read state under RTNL in their commit phase (bond_miimon_commit/bond_ab_arp_commit); bond_alb_monitor() was the only one acting on the pre-trylock decision. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74725 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: enic: fix tx_hang_reset use-after-free on device removal enic_remove() cancels the reset and change_mtu_work items but does not cancel tx_hang_reset. A TX timeout that fires while the device is being removed can schedule enic_tx_hang_reset() so that it runs after free_netdev(), resulting in a use-after-free. cancel_work_sync() alone is not sufficient here: the still-live watchdog and notify paths can re-schedule these work items in the window between the cancel and unregister_netdev(). Use disable_work_sync(), which cancels the work and blocks any subsequent schedule_work() from requeuing it, and apply it to the reset and change_mtu_work items as well so the same requeue race is closed for all teardown work. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74724 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: avoid out-of-bounds write in ip_vs_nat_icmp Sashiko warns that local attacker can modify the packet while it is processed by IPVS. Some places read the IP ihl field multiple times which can cause out-of-bounds access. One such place is ip_vs_nat_icmp where we can write after the validated area. Fix it by providing ciph argument just like it is done for IPv6 and use ciph->len as offset to the embedded transport header. Modify some IPv4 header checks by reading the ihl field only once. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74720 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic When scalar += pointer is handled in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the destination register inherits the pointer state from the source pointer. Copying only selected fields is fragile because pointer provenance is tracked by several bpf_reg_state fields. Use the caller's temporary offset register to preserve the scalar operand while replacing the destination with the full pointer state. This preserves the frame number for PTR_TO_STACK registers and keeps parent identity fields consistent. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74717 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: fw_tracer, return NULL on create error Tracer creation can fail by returning either NULL or ERR_PTR. The return value is stored without a check on the device, and users treat ERR_PTR and NULL the same way. This also causes a crash in the core dump logic, which is missing the ERR_PTR check and ends up dereferencing it, as shown in the trace below. Switch tracer creation to return NULL on failure only, so callers only need a single NULL check. Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core ipv6 mlx5_core CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.19.7 #1 PREEMPT(none) Workqueue: mlx5_health0001:01:00.0 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] pstate: a3400009 (NzCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x58/0xe0 [mlx5_core] lr : mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x40/0xe0 [mlx5_core] sp : ffff800081cf3c40 x29: ffff800081cf3c90 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff000080018828 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff000080304a05 x23: ffff800081cf3d80 x22: ffff0000847e01a0 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff0000847e01a0 x19: ffffffffffffffa1 x18: ffff80008310bbf0 x17: ffff800080119650 x16: ffff80008010df54 x15: ffff80008010d4ac x14: ffff800079c202e4 x13: ffff80008002fe60 x12: ffff800080119650 x11: ffff80008010df54 x10: ffff80008010d4ac x9 : ffff800079c203d8 x8 : ffff800081cf3c88 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : 0000000000000030 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000c5c4000e Call trace: mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x58/0xe0 [mlx5_core] (P) mlx5_fw_reporter_dump+0x30/0x2e0 [mlx5_core] devlink_health_do_dump+0x9c/0x160 devlink_health_report+0x1c0/0x288 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work+0xac/0xc0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x15c/0x3d8 worker_thread+0x18c/0x320 kthread+0x148/0x228 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: b9400000 5ac00800 7a401800 540003ca (3940a260) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x000000,00078031,75fce5a1,35fffe67 Memory Limit: none ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception ]--- | ||||