| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An endpoint used during initial appliance setup did not require authentication and did not correctly enforce its intended state precondition, so during the initial activation window an unauthenticated network attacker could repeatedly re-trigger the privileged activation process. This could disrupt setup and leave the appliance in an incompletely configured state. The issue is only reachable while an appliance is being activated for the first time and not yet fully configured. |
| On deployments where the remote-support capability is licensed and enabled, an authenticated System Administrator who also possessed the key protecting the submitted data could redirect the underlying system's outbound support connection to a destination of their choosing. That destination could then have operating-system commands executed on the node and receive their output, potentially resulting in remote code execution with the privileges of a local service account. |
| A path traversal weakness in an optional, non-default administrative feature allowed an authenticated administrator to move files to unintended locations outside the feature's designated directory. This could potentially be leveraged to execute arbitrary code on the underlying system. |
| In multi-node deployments, an attacker who had already obtained code execution on one appliance node could submit a value through an internal cluster interface that was written into monitoring configuration on another node without sufficient validation, potentially allowing OS commands to be executed there. Execution was limited to an unprivileged service account on that node. |
| An authenticated administrator could bypass the content validation applied to an administrative file upload and store a file containing dangerous content on the appliance. This did not by itself result in code execution, which would require a separate vulnerability to run the stored file. |
| An authenticated administrator on a node with an optional, separately licensed gateway role enabled could supply a connector URL that the server retrieved without sufficient validation of its scheme or destination, causing the server to issue requests to internal network services. Exploitation requires the licensed gateway role to be active. |
| An authenticated administrator could initiate an administrative import using a file whose contents were not fully verified, because the import validated only the file's header rather than the complete file. This could allow unverified or forged content to be accepted and processed, affecting the integrity of the imported data. |
| An unauthenticated attacker could cause a file with attacker-controlled content to be written to the appliance filesystem through an administrative upload handler that did not properly authenticate the request. This did not by itself result in code execution, which would require a separate vulnerability to place the file in an executable location. |
| An authenticated administrator could cause the server to issue requests to, and interact with, internal network services that are not meant to be reachable through this interface. On its own this did not result in code execution. |
| An authenticated Email Protection Gateway administrator holding only limited, delegated permissions could write files with attacker-controlled content to arbitrary locations accessible to the Email Protection Gateway service account. This exceeds the administrator's intended privileges and could be used to alter application files and configuration or to disrupt the availability of the service. |
| On a Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway cluster with database replication enabled, a party trusted by the cluster could submit a crafted serialized object that was deserialized without sufficient validation, potentially allowing code execution as the gateway service account. Replication is disabled by default, and exploitation requires control of a trusted cluster peer or administrative access to the appliance. |
| An optional, separately licensed repository-connector feature in Kiteworks Core did not neutralize special characters in a user-supplied path before passing it to an external command. An authenticated system administrator could inject additional commands and write arbitrary content to files owned by the service account running the connector, enabling code execution in that account's context; exploitation additionally requires network egress from the appliance to a system under the attacker's control. |
| Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway rejected certain configuration settings, but its validation did not recognize every form in which they could be supplied. An authenticated administrator could potentially use an unrecognized form to have a file of their choosing written to the gateway and executed, resulting in code execution as the gateway service account. |
| Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not sufficiently validate the content of an uploaded backup, and allowed an administrator to influence how the application loaded it. An authenticated administrator could potentially use this to execute arbitrary code on the gateway as the underlying service account. |
| A user-provisioning interface in Kiteworks Core did not verify that the requesting administrator was entitled to grant the role being assigned. An administrator whose delegated permissions covered role changes alone could therefore raise an account to full system-administrator privileges. |
| An identity-verification weakness in Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway allowed the gateway to act on the Kiteworks platform on behalf of a user it had not authenticated, and to provision a platform account for an identity it did not already know. A remote, unauthenticated sender could potentially exploit this to obtain control of a platform account. |
| An XML parser used by Kiteworks Email Protection Gateway did not restrict external entity references. Where an optional, non-default message-processing feature is enabled, a remote and unauthenticated sender could potentially use a crafted message to read files accessible to the gateway service account, including cryptographic key material and credentials, and have them sent to a destination they control. |
| The sandbox that isolates document conversion on a Kiteworks appliance did not fully confine the code running inside it. Code already executing within that sandbox could potentially escape its confinement and act with the privileges of the service account that runs the application, which could allow an attacker in that position to read or modify application data and configuration, or to disrupt the service on the affected appliance. |
| A Kiteworks appliance setup interface did not enforce authentication once the appliance had completed initial configuration. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the appliance could read and modify a limited set of setup records, including a contact name and email address captured during initial configuration. |
| A form-rendering interface in the Advanced Forms component is reachable without authentication so that published forms can be displayed to anonymous visitors, but it returned more data than the form itself required. Anyone who knew the web address of a published form could potentially retrieve the form owner's Kiteworks account profile, including personal details, along with parts of the deployment's configuration settings; no passwords, authentication tokens, or multi-factor secrets were exposed. |
