| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Joplin is an open source note-taking and to-do application that organises notes and lists into notebooks. Prior to 3.7.13, when Joplin Desktop is running with the opt-in Web Clipper server enabled, the server in packages/lib/ClipperServer.ts sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and allows an arbitrary website to call POST /auth and GET /auth/check because the pairing endpoints do not reject HTTP or HTTPS origins. The desktop confirmation dialog does not identify the requesting origin, so a victim who approves the generic prompt authorizes the attacking page, which then receives the permanent API token. The token provides ongoing read and write access to notes, folders, tags, resources, and master keys. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.13. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.4.0 until 2.14.0, PyJWT HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key is affected because asymmetric-key guard relies on textual markers that are absent from DER encoding. This occurs when an application mixes HMAC and asymmetric algorithms and supplies a DER public key as the shared verification key. As a result, PyJWT uses public DER bytes as an HMAC secret. Consequently, an attacker who knows the public key can forge authenticated HMAC tokens. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key in jwt/algorithms.py is affected because raw-JWK detector does not normalize accepted Unicode byte-order marks before checking for JSON. This occurs when a public JWK is prefixed with a UTF-8 BOM and used in a mixed-algorithm verification path. As a result, public JWK bypasses asymmetric-key detection and becomes the HMAC secret. Consequently, an attacker who knows the public key can forge authenticated tokens. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, PyJWT HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key is affected because HMAC key guard only recognizes top-level public JWK forms and misses container representations. This occurs when an application allows HMAC and asymmetric algorithms and passes a public JWK container as the raw key. As a result, public asymmetric key material is accepted as the HMAC secret. Consequently, an attacker who knows the public key can forge a token with arbitrary authenticated claims. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.1.0 until 2.15.0, PyJWT OKPAlgorithm.from_jwk in jwt/algorithms.py is affected because private-JWK import path does not compare the public key derived from d with x. This occurs when an OKP private JWK supplies non-corresponding x and d components. As a result, identity derived from x can differ from operations performed with d. Consequently, if an integration also accepts private key parameters from a proof header without rejecting them, an attacker may use a stolen sender-constrained token without the legitimate private key. This issue is fixed in version 2.15.0. |
| WSS4J EncryptedHeader child confusion could promote an attacker-controlled plaintext element as the decrypted header, leading to incorrect confidentiality coverage and possible policy bypass.
Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.0.2 or 3.0.6 or 2.4.4, which fix this issue. |
| OpenAM before 16.1.3 contains an open redirect vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to redirect users by supplying an unverified id_token_hint to the /oauth2/connect/endSession endpoint. Attackers can name any realm client in a forged hint to redirect victims to any registered post-logout URI, enabling phishing that borrows the OpenAM host's trust. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the streaming CMS AuthenticatedData parser accepted a message whose digestAlgorithm and authAttrs fields disagreed about whether authenticated attributes were present. RFC 5652 sec. 9.1 pairs the two, requiring that authAttrs be present whenever digestAlgorithm is, and sec. 9.2 makes the MAC cover the DER encoding of authAttrs when they are present and the eContent OCTET STRING directly when they are not. CMSAuthenticatedDataParser has to choose between those two in its constructor, before it can reach authAttrs, which comes later in the SEQUENCE, so it chose on digestAlgorithm alone: for a message with digestAlgorithm absent but authAttrs present it verified the content MAC and then returned the attributes through getAuthAttrs() as though they had been authenticated, when the MAC had never covered them. An attacker able to modify a message in transit could insert an authenticated attribute, such as an RFC 2634 ESSSecurityLabel, into an otherwise valid message while holding neither the key-encryption key nor the content-MAC key, and an application taking an authorization, routing or labelling decision from those attributes would act on attacker-chosen values. The content itself remained MAC-bound. asn1.cms.AuthenticatedData now rejects the mismatched pairing when parsing and CMSAuthenticatedDataParser cross-checks the two fields once authAttrs is read. This is a variant of CVE-2026-59642, which bound the content to the MAC for messages that legitimately carry authAttrs, and which does not address this case. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpkix-fips 1.0.13 (1.0.X series), 2.0.13 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.13 (2.1.X series), and bcutil-fips 2.0.8 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.8 (2.1.X series). |
| A vulnerability in Apache Sling Security Bundle: the ReferrerFilter accepts weaker-than-orgin evidence.
This issue affects Apache Sling Security Bundle: before 1.3.2.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.3.2, which fixes the issue. |
| Zebra before 4.4.0 contains a consensus divergence vulnerability in V5 transparent signature verification, computing a ZIP-244 digest for SIGHASH_SINGLE inputs lacking corresponding outputs instead of failing. Attackers can craft V5 transactions with fewer outputs than inputs that Zebra accepts and templates via getblocktemplate, producing blocks zcashd rejects. |
| simple-php-router through 5.4.1.7 contains an IP restriction bypass vulnerability in the IpRestrictAccess middleware that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to bypass IP whitelist and blacklist protections. Attackers can spoof X-Forwarded-For, CF-Connecting-IP, or Client-IP headers to impersonate whitelisted addresses or evade blacklists, gaining access to IP-restricted routes. |
| Site isolation issue in the Reader Mode component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 156, Firefox ESR 153.3, Thunderbird 156, and Thunderbird 153.3. |
| Authlib version 1.7.2 and below contains a vulnerability where discovery JSON metadata is cached without validation or issuer-origin binding. This allows a poisoned discovery response to replace all endpoint values with attacker-controlled values rather than endpoint URLs that share the origin of the configured server metadata URL. |
| Cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability in Apache Directory LDAP API.
A StartTLS extended operation started after a Search request has been sent can lead to receive data in plain text before the TLS Handshake has been completed.
This issue affects Apache Directory LDAP API: from 2.1.0 before 2.1.9.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.9, which fixes the issue. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, a truncated OpenPGP encrypted message was accepted with no error reported, and on the SEIPD version 1 path with no integrity check performed at all. RFC 9580 sec. 13.7 permits an implementation to release the cleartext of the fully authenticated chunks when streaming but requires it to indicate a clear error as soon as the truncation is detected, and to report suspect integrity when it discovers malleable ciphertext. The truncation was detected and then discarded: when a message is truncated but the length field of the enclosing packet is left unchanged, BCPGInputStream.PartialInputStream raises an EOFException for the missing ciphertext, and BCPGInputStream.nextPacketTag() reports an EOFException as a clean end of message, so the packet stream above it stopped as though no packets remained. On the AEAD path (SEIPD version 2 and the version 5 AEAD packet), when the literal data packet ended on an AEAD chunk boundary and the consumer read in increments smaller than one chunk, the look-ahead for the packet after the literal triggered the truncated chunk read, so BcAEADUtil and JceAEADUtil never reached the trailing message tag of sec. 5.13.2 that authenticates the total plaintext length; the caller received the plaintext of the fully authenticated chunks, every packet following the literal was silently dropped, and no exception was raised, so a signed and encrypted message read back as a well-formed unsigned one. Every byte released on that path remained individually authenticated, making this a missing truncation error rather than a forgery, and it is a residual of CVE-2026-12817, which closed the same outcome for an attacker who corrects the outer packet length. On the SEIPD version 1 path the consequence was more serious: IntegrityProtectedInputStream verifies the modification detection code from close(), and reached close() only by closing itself when a read of it returned -1, which a truncated message never produces, so PGPEncryptedData.verify() never ran and the recipient was handed CFB-decrypted plaintext on which no integrity check of any kind had been performed. Measured on a message truncated into that shape, 136 distinct single-byte modifications of the ciphertext produced accepted, altered plaintext with no exception raised. Reachability is a property of the message rather than of attacker-supplied input: the AEAD shape held for 3 of 131 consecutive payload lengths measured, and the SEIPD version 1 shape for one payload length in sixteen, at a truncation offset that did not move with the payload length. The low-level API is unaffected, a caller that invokes PGPEncryptedData.verify() directly getting the check regardless, as are consumers reading in increments of a whole AEAD chunk or more. The AEAD decryption streams now re-throw such an EOFException as a plain IOException, which nextPacketTag() does not launder; OpenPGPMessageInputStream.close() now closes its layer's integrity-protected stream itself rather than relying on that stream having seen the end of its data; and IntegrityProtectedInputStream.close() was made idempotent, as java.io.Closeable requires, which that depends on, since the stream is genuinely closed twice on the ordinary path and PGPEncryptedData.verify() consumes the digest state behind it and cannot be run a second time. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, on the AEAD route only, as that edition does not ship the high-level OpenPGP API the SEIPDv1 route runs through. It also affects Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpg-fips 1.0.14 (1.0.X series), 2.0.14.1 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.14 (2.1.X series), on the AEAD route only, as those editions do not ship the high-level OpenPGP API. |
| Site isolation issue in the Graphics component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 156 and Thunderbird 156. |
| Denuvo Anti-Tamper through 2026-03-04 allows bypass of a hypervisor presence check via CPUID interception (SimpleSvm.sys on AMD; hyperkd.sys and hyperhv.dll on Intel). |
| Site isolation issue in the DOM: Networking component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox ESR 153.4, Thunderbird 157, Thunderbird 153.4, and Firefox 157. |
| A flaw was found in RESTEasy's CorsFilter, which, when configured to allow all origins ("*"), reflects the request's Origin header back in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This permissive cross-origin policy allows a malicious website to make credentialed cross-origin requests and read authenticated responses from a victim's session, resulting in a loss of confidentiality. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, BLS12_381BasicScheme.keyValidate, and so BLSPublicKeyParameters and every BasicScheme, MessageAugmentation and ProofOfPossession verify and aggregateVerify that gate on it, accepted a public key built on a foreign ECCurve that merely shares BLS12-381's field characteristic. The prime-order subgroup check trusts a point's own curve to name its cofactor, since ECPoint.satisfiesOrder returns true outright when the curve's cofactor is one, so a point on a curve with a different equation and a cofactor forged to one passed keyValidate despite not being a G1 point at all. In BC's pairing implementation such a point contributes the identity in the target group, so an aggregate signature verified against a set of public keys including it is accepted even though it contains no signature for that key and message pair, admitting a phantom signer. keyValidate now first confirms that the point's curve carries exactly the canonical G1 field, equation, order and cofactor before any subgroup check. The issue is reachable only where an application constructs an ECPoint on an explicit, non-canonical curve and accepts it as an authority-bearing key; the standard 48-byte compressed-point decoder always supplies the canonical curve and was never affected. |
