| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix CPU stall in xilinx_dma_poll_timeout
Currently when calling xilinx_dma_poll_timeout with delay_us=0 and a
condition that is never fulfilled, the CPU busy-waits for prolonged time
and the timeout triggers only with a massive delay causing a CPU stall.
This happens due to a huge underestimation of wall clock time in
poll_timeout_us_atomic. Commit 7349a69cf312 ("iopoll: Do not use
timekeeping in read_poll_timeout_atomic()") changed the behavior to no
longer use ktime_get at the expense of underestimation of wall clock
time which appears to be very large for delay_us=0. Instead of timing
out after approximately XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT microseconds, the timeout
takes XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT * 1000 * (time that the overhead of the for
loop in poll_timeout_us_atomic takes) which is in the range of several
minutes for XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT=1000000. Fix this by using a non-zero
value for delay_us. Use delay_us=10 to keep the delay in the hot path of
starting DMA transfers minimal but still avoid CPU stalls in case of
unexpected hardware failures.
One-off measurement with delay_us=0 causes the cpu to busy wait around 7
minutes in the timeout case. After applying this patch with delay_us=10
the measured timeout was 1053428 microseconds which is roughly
equivalent to the expected 1000000 microseconds specified in
XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT.
Add a constant XILINX_DMA_POLL_DELAY_US for delay_us value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10
Andrii reported an issue with optimized uprobes [1] that can clobber
redzone area with call instruction storing return address on stack
where user code may keep temporary data without adjusting rsp.
Fixing this by moving the optimized uprobes on top of 10-bytes nop
instruction, so we can squeeze another instruction to escape the
redzone area before doing the call, like:
lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp
call tramp
Note the lea instruction is used to adjust the rsp register without
changing the flags.
We use nop10 and following transformation to optimized instructions
above and back as suggested by Peterz [2].
Optimize path (int3_update_optimize):
1) Initial state after set_swbp() installed the uprobe:
cc 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
From offset 0 this is INT3 followed by the tail of the original
10-byte NOP.
After a previous unoptimization bytes 5..9 may still contain the
old call instruction, which remains valid for threads already there.
2) Rewrite the LEA tail and call displacement:
cc [8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3]
From offset 0 this traps on the uprobe INT3. Bytes 1..9 are not
executable entry points while byte 0 is trapped.
3) Publish the first LEA byte:
[48] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this is:
lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp
call <uprobe-trampoline>
Unoptimize path (int3_update_unoptimize):
1) Initial optimized state:
48 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
Same as 3) above.
2) Trap new entries before restoring the NOP bytes:
[cc] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this traps. A thread that had already executed the
LEA can still reach the intact CALL at offset 5.
3) Restore bytes 1..4 of the original NOP while keeping byte 0 trapped
and byte 5 as CALL.
cc [2e 0f 1f 84] e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this still traps. Offset 5 is still the CALL for any
thread that was already past the first LEA byte.
4) Publish the first byte of the original NOP:
[66] 2e 0f 1f 84 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this is the restored 10-byte NOP; the CALL opcode and
displacement are now only NOP operands. Offset 5 still decodes as
CALL for a thread that was already there.
Tthere is only a single target uprobe-trampoline for the given nop10
instruction address, so the CALL instruction will not be changed across
unoptimization/optimization cycles.
Therefore, any task that is preempted at the CALL instruction is guaranteed
to observe that CALL and not anything else.
Note as explained in [2] we need to use following nop10:
PF1 PF2 ESC NOPL MOD SIB DISP32
NOP10: 0x66, 0x2e, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 -- cs nopw 0x00000000(%rax,%rax,1)
which means we need to allow 0x2e prefix which maps to INAT_PFX_CS
attribute in is_prefix_bad function.
Also changing the uprobe syscall error when called out of uprobe
trampoline to -EPROTO, so we are able to detect the fixed kernel.
The optimized uprobe performance stays the same:
uprobe-nop : 3.129 ± 0.013M/s
uprobe-push : 3.045 ± 0.006M/s
uprobe-ret : 1.095 ± 0.004M/s
--> uprobe-nop10 : 7.170 ± 0.020M/s
uretprobe-nop : 2.143 ± 0.021M/s
uretprobe-push : 2.090 ± 0.000M/s
uretprobe-ret : 0.942 ± 0.000M/s
--> uretprobe-nop10: 3.381 ± 0.003M/s
usdt-nop : 3.245 ± 0.004M/s
--> usdt-nop10 : 7.256 ± 0.023M/s
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260509003146.976844-1-andrii@kernel.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260518104306.GU3102624@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/#t |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject MEM_ALLOC BTF accesses past object bounds
BTF struct walks relax the struct-size check for accesses through a
trailing flexible array. That is valid for ordinary BTF type walking, but
PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC values point to objects allocated with the static
BTF type size.
When walking a MEM_ALLOC object, reject the access before applying the
flexible-array relaxation if the access range extends past the struct size.
Apply the same policy to struct ID matching so kfunc and kptr type checks
do not walk past the allocated object bounds either. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject writes through untrusted BTF pointers
check_ptr_to_btf_access() lets program-type btf_struct_access callbacks
validate writes before the default BTF access path rejects non-read
accesses. That bypasses the read-only policy for untrusted BTF pointers
created by helpers such as bpf_rdonly_cast().
Reject non-read accesses through PTR_UNTRUSTED BTF pointers at the
common entry point, before the callback branch to handle all cases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell-wmi-base: Fix handling of ultra performance key
The commit message of commit 5fbd827eb9c2 ("platform/x86: dell-wmi: Recognise or support new switches")
states that the ultra performance key contains additional data
after the type and code fields. The event data passed to
dell_wmi_process_key() is already parsed, so "buffer" already
starts after those two fields.
Use the correct index for accessing the first data field to avoid
a potential buffer overread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject rdonly/rdwr_buf_size kfunc arguments that exceed u32 max
check_kfunc_args() detects a kfunc argument named rdonly_buf_size or
rdwr_buf_size and stores reg->var_off.value into meta->r0_size, a u64,
and does not bound it. check_kfunc_call() later copies that value into
the returned register's mem_size field:
meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value;
...
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size;
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size is u32. A constant whose upper 32 bits are set
gets truncated instead of causing a load-time rejection, so the verifier
records a PTR_TO_MEM register with an approximately 4 GiB mem_size for
whatever allocation the kfunc returned. A later access check against
that register uses the truncated, wrong bound.
Reject rdonly_buf_size/rdwr_buf_size values that exceed U32_MAX at the
point meta->r0_size is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uac: validate rate list length before storing
UAC1 and UAC2 configfs rate-list attributes parse a comma-separated
list of sampling rates and store each parsed value in fixed-size arrays.
The arrays have UAC_MAX_RATES entries, but the store paths do not check
that the input contains at most that many tokens before writing through
opts->name##s[i++].
Writing more than ten rates therefore writes past the end of the
p_srates[] or c_srates[] array in struct f_uac1_opts or struct
f_uac2_opts.
With CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS enabled, writing an 11-entry rate list to the
UAC1 p_srate attribute reports:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac1.c:1669:1
index 10 is out of range for type 'int [10]'
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold
f_uac1_opts_p_srate_store
configfs_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
The same reproducer against the UAC2 p_srate attribute reports:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c:2087:1
index 10 is out of range for type 'int [10]'
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold
f_uac2_opts_p_srate_store
configfs_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
Reject additional tokens once UAC_MAX_RATES entries have been parsed.
Also keep the original kstrdup() pointer for kfree(), because strsep()
advances the parsing cursor. Freeing the advanced cursor leaks the
original buffer on successful parses and can free an interior pointer on
some error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: asus-wmi: fix resource leaks on probe failure
During driver initialization in asus_wmi_add(), various subsystems are
registered sequentially. However, the error path labels are out of order
relative to the registration sequence.
Specifically:
1. If asus_wmi_custom_fan_curve_init() fails, the driver jumps to
fail_custom_fan_curve. Because this label is placed below fail_sysfs,
it bypasses the cleanup calls for the input device and sysfs groups,
which were successfully registered before, leaking those resources.
2. If asus_screenpad_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_screenpad.
Because fail_screenpad is placed below fail_backlight, it bypasses the
cleanup calls for backlight and rfkill, leaking those resources.
Fix these resource leaks by reordering the error path labels in
asus_wmi_add() to match the exact reverse order of the resource
allocations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()
esp_ssg_unref() releases the page references held on the source
scatterlist after the AEAD operation completes. It calls
skb_page_unref() on every frag page for an out-of-place transform
(req->src != req->dst), and in the error path of esp_output_tail()
(already_unref == true) on the request's own scatterlist.
This is wrong when the skb carries managed frags
(SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS). Managed frags are owned by a zerocopy ubuf
and the skb does not hold a per-frag page reference; io_uring SEND_ZC
with a registered buffer attaches the bvec pages this way via
io_sg_from_iter(). The rest of the stack honours this invariant:
skb_release_data() skips the per-frag unref when SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS
is set, and skb_zcopy_managed() is the guard used at the other unref
sites.
esp_ssg_unref() is missing that guard, so for a managed-frag skb it
drops a page reference the skb never acquired. This can underflow the
page reference count and free a page that is still in use.
Guard the function with skb_zcopy_managed() so both unref paths are
skipped for managed-frag skbs, matching skb_release_data(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rvt: Return NULL after port allocation failure
rvt_alloc_device() deallocates the IB device when its port array cannot
be allocated but then returns the pointer to the released allocation.
Callers treat any non-NULL value as valid and dereference it, resulting
in a use-after-free.
Return NULL immediately after deallocation so callers can propagate the
allocation failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/resctrl: Fix UAF from worker threads when domains are removed
The mbm_handle_overflow() and cqm_handle_limbo() workers read event counters
and may sleep while doing so. They are scheduled via delayed_work embedded in
struct rdt_l3_mon_domain. Architecture allocates and frees these domains from
CPU hotplug callbacks under cpus_write_lock(), and the workers acquire
cpus_read_lock() to keep the domain alive across their access.
A use-after-free can occur when a worker is blocked waiting for
cpus_read_lock() while the hotplug core holds cpus_write_lock(): the
architecture frees the rdt_l3_mon_domain that contains the worker's
work_struct. When the worker unblocks, the container_of() it performs on the
embedded work pointer dereferences freed memory.
Drop cpus_read_lock() from the workers and instead drain pending and in-flight
work synchronously before the architecture can free the domain. Since
architecture offlines the domain under cpus_write_lock() after it has been
unlinked from the RCU list and a grace period has elapsed, no new work can be
scheduled. The cancel only needs to wait out existing work. Drop
rdtgroup_mutex during CPU offline around cancel_delayed_work_sync() so that
a worker waiting on the mutex can complete before re-pinning the work on
a different CPU.
When offlining a CPU the architecture may iterate over resources in any order.
For example, the MBA control domain may be offlined before or after
a corresponding L3 monitor domain. Ensure that resctrl fs cancels the workers
no matter what order the architecture offlines the domains. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: Serialize multi-part Get/Set Feature transfers
A Get or Set Feature payload larger than the mailbox payload size is
split into several mailbox commands. mbox_mutex only serializes
individual mailbox commands and is dropped between iterations of these
loops. Nothing serializes the multi-part transfer as a whole.
cxl_get_feature() and cxl_set_feature() are reachable concurrently
from fwctl (per-fd RPCs run under a read-held registration lock) and
from the EDAC scrub/ECS/repair paths, so two transfers to the same
mailbox can interleave their parts and corrupt the device's transfer
context.
Add a per-mailbox feat_mutex and hold it across the whole transfer in
both functions. It nests outside mbox_mutex (which is taken inside
cxl_internal_send_cmd()), and is taken nowhere else, so no lock-ordering
inversion is introduced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix SCMI device destroy lifetimes
scmi_child_dev_find() drops the reference returned by
device_find_child() before returning the scmi_device pointer. A
concurrent unregister can then release the device while the destroy path
is still using the returned pointer.
Make the lookup helper return the device_find_child() reference and keep
it until scmi_device_destroy() has finished unregistering the child.
Also split device_unregister() in __scmi_device_destroy() so the SCMI bus
ID is not made reusable until after device_del() has removed the old
scmi_dev.N name from sysfs. This avoids a new SCMI device reusing the
same ID while the old device is still registered.
The final device release callback is also a possible cleanup path when
SCMI children are deleted by driver core recursion rather than
__scmi_device_destroy(). Release the SCMI bus ID from a common helper
used by destroy, register-failure and final-release paths, and clear
scmi_dev->id after freeing it so the final release cannot free the same
ID again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix ABBA deadlock in ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find()
Syzbot/stress-ng reported an ABBA deadlock in ext4 when exercising
concurrent xattr workloads (using the ea_inode mount/format option).
The deadlock occurs between the running transaction and the eviction
thread:
- Task 1 (stress-ng): Holds a reference to a shared mbcache_entry (ce)
and calls ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find() -> ext4_iget() to retrieve
the corresponding EA inode. Since the EA inode is currently being
evicted, ext4_iget() blocks in __wait_on_freeing_inode() waiting for
eviction to complete.
- Task 2 (eviction thread): Currently evicting the same EA inode in
ext4_evict_ea_inode(). It calls mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(oe) which
blocks waiting for Task 1 to release the reference to the mbcache_entry.
To break this deadlock, implement a new ext4_iget() configuration flag
named EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT. When set, perform a non-blocking lookup of the
inode via VFS's find_inode_nowait() API.
If the inode is currently being evicted (marked with I_FREEING or
I_WILL_FREE) or created (I_CREATING), or if it is not present in the VFS
inode cache (cache miss), simply skip it (returning -ENOENT) rather than
waiting for eviction/creation to complete, breaking the ABBA cycle.
Since we return -ENOENT immediately on a cache miss, we never attempt to
allocate a new inode or call iget_locked(), completely eliminating any
TOCTOU race window.
If the returned inode is I_NEW, wait for its initialization to clear via
wait_on_new_inode(). If initialization fails and the inode is unhashed
during wait_on_new_inode() waking up (e.g., due to an I/O read error in
another thread), safely drop the reference and return -ENOENT. This
unhashed check is executed unconditionally on all cache-hit pathways to
properly handle concurrent initialization failures.
Finally, standard validation checks (including is_bad_inode,
EXT4_EA_INODE_FL, file_acl, and xattr flags) are executed as normal inside
check_igot_inode() to fully guarantee VFS-layer safety.
In ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find(), invoke ext4_iget() with the new
EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT flag to perform the non-blocking cache search. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix WARNING in bpf_tracing_link_release
The trampoline could be corrupted by the blindly
'tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX' in verifier.
1. A fexit attached to a tail_call_reachable prog. 'tr->flags' became
'BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG | BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX'. And, the
trampoline would poke the target prog's nop insn using jmp insn instead
of call insn.
2. Another fexit loaded with the same tail_call_reachable prog target.
'tr->flags' became 'BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX'.
3. Close the first fexit link. Due to no BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG in
'tr->flags', the trampoline will fail to restore the prog's nop insn
using call insn.
[ 3.410719] WARNING: kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3551 at bpf_tracing_link_release+0x53/0x60, CPU#1: test_progs/98
...
[ 3.428793] bpf_link_free+0x58/0x130
[ 3.429293] bpf_link_release+0x23/0x30
Fix the warning by updating 'tr->flags' with '|=' and lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: mediatek: use devm_gpiochip_add_data() for GPIO chip
The gpio_chip is allocated with device-managed memory but registered with
the non-managed gpiochip_add_data(). This was harmless while the drivers
were built-in, but once they can be built as modules and unbound/rmmod'd,
devm frees the gpio_chip's memory while it is still registered, causing a
use-after-free.
Register it with devm_gpiochip_add_data() so it shares the same
device-managed lifecycle, which also lets the manual gpiochip_remove()
error paths go away. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Validate string descriptors
The string descriptor length includes a two-byte header while the UTF-16
payload starts after it. utf16s_to_utf8s() expects a count of UTF-16 code
units, not bytes. Passing the payload byte count can make it read beyond
the descriptor buffer.
Validate that the payload has an even byte count, pass a code-unit count to
the converter, and allocate sufficient UTF-8 output space.
The raw string buffer starts after the descriptor header but its size is
bLength. Copying bLength bytes from that pointer can read beyond the
response buffer.
Allocate a zeroed bLength-sized buffer and copy only the UTF-16
payload. This preserves the raw buffer size consumed by the RPMB device-ID
ABI while avoiding the overread. |
| The Rede Itaú for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 5.5.3 does not verify the authenticity of a payment gateway webhook before updating an order's status, allowing unauthenticated attackers to change the status of arbitrary WooCommerce orders, including marking unpaid orders as paid and cancelling completed orders. |
| The Rede Itaú for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 5.5.3 does not verify the authenticity of a payment gateway webhook before updating an order's status, allowing unauthenticated attackers to change the status of arbitrary WooCommerce orders, including orders that were already paid or completed. |
| The YITH WooCommerce Popup WordPress plugin before 1.60.0 does not check the capability of the requesting user before deleting post meta, allowing users with the Contributor role and above to delete arbitrary post meta from any post, including content owned by higher-privileged users. |
