| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_int() CONS case
In decode_int(), the CONS case calls get_bits(bs, 2) to read a length
value, then calls get_uint(bs, len) without checking that len bytes
remain in the buffer. The existing boundary check only validates the
2 bits for get_bits(), not the subsequent 1-4 bytes that get_uint()
reads. This allows a malformed H.323/RAS packet to cause a 1-4 byte
slab-out-of-bounds read.
Add a boundary check for len bytes after get_bits() and before
get_uint(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: check for zero length in DecodeQ931()
In DecodeQ931(), the UserUserIE code path reads a 16-bit length from
the packet, then decrements it by 1 to skip the protocol discriminator
byte before passing it to DecodeH323_UserInformation(). If the encoded
length is 0, the decrement wraps to -1, which is then passed as a
large value to the decoder, leading to an out-of-bounds read.
Add a check to ensure len is positive after the decrement. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: always free skb on ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() failure
ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() has three error paths, but only two of them
free the skb. The first error path (ieee80211_tx_prepare() returning
TX_DROP) does not free it, while invoke_tx_handlers() failure and the
fragmentation check both do.
Add kfree_skb() to the first error path so all three are consistent,
and remove the now-redundant frees in callers (ath9k, mt76,
mac80211_hwsim) to avoid double-free.
Document the skb ownership guarantee in the function's kdoc. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting multiple L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ
Currently the code attempts to accept requests regardless of the
command identifier which may cause multiple requests to be marked
as pending (FLAG_DEFER_SETUP) which can cause more than
L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID(5) to be allocated in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer
causing an overflow.
The spec is quite clear that the same identifier shall not be used on
subsequent requests:
'Within each signaling channel a different Identifier shall be used
for each successive request or indication.'
https://www.bluetooth.com/wp-content/uploads/Files/Specification/HTML/Core-62/out/en/host/logical-link-control-and-adaptation-protocol-specification.html#UUID-32a25a06-4aa4-c6c7-77c5-dcfe3682355d
So this attempts to check if there are any channels pending with the
same identifier and rejects if any are found. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpaa2-switch: add bounds check for if_id in IRQ handler
The IRQ handler extracts if_id from the upper 16 bits of the hardware
status register and uses it to index into ethsw->ports[] without
validation. Since if_id can be any 16-bit value (0-65535) but the ports
array is only allocated with sw_attr.num_ifs elements, this can lead to
an out-of-bounds read potentially.
Add a bounds check before accessing the array, consistent with the
existing validation in dpaa2_switch_rx(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: i2c-hid: fix potential buffer overflow in i2c_hid_get_report()
`i2c_hid_xfer` is used to read `recv_len + sizeof(__le16)` bytes of data
into `ihid->rawbuf`.
The former can come from the userspace in the hidraw driver and is only
bounded by HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE(16384) by default (unless we also set
`max_buffer_size` field of `struct hid_ll_driver` which we do not).
The latter has size determined at runtime by the maximum size of
different report types you could receive on any particular device and
can be a much smaller value.
Fix this by truncating `recv_len` to `ihid->bufsize - sizeof(__le16)`.
The impact is low since access to hidraw devices requires root. |
| JuggleIM im-server through 1.8.16 ships default administrator credentials admin/123456 that allow unauthenticated remote attackers to access the admin console on port 8090. Attackers can log in as administrator, even after account deletion since CheckLogin recreates it, to control tenant applications and app secrets. |
| libmodplug through 0.8.9.1 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read vulnerability in CSoundFile::ReadAMS2() in src/load_ams.cpp that allows attackers to read adjacent heap memory via crafted AMS files. Attackers can supply an AMS module whose pattern effect bytes keep bit 7 set, driving the decoder past the input buffer and crashing any libmodplug consumer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Correct the allocation size for bytes controls
The size of the data behind of scontrol->ipc_control_data for bytes
controls is:
[1] sizeof(struct sof_ipc4_control_data) + // kernel only struct
[2] sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)) + payload
The max_size specifies the size of [2] and it is coming from topology.
Change the function to take this into account and allocate adequate amount
of memory behind scontrol->ipc_control_data.
With the change we will allocate [1] amount more memory to be able to hold
the full size of data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-verity: disable recursive forward error correction
There are two problems with the recursive correction:
1. It may cause denial-of-service. In fec_read_bufs, there is a loop that
has 253 iterations. For each iteration, we may call verity_hash_for_block
recursively. There is a limit of 4 nested recursions - that means that
there may be at most 253^4 (4 billion) iterations. Red Hat QE team
actually created an image that pushes dm-verity to this limit - and this
image just makes the udev-worker process get stuck in the 'D' state.
2. It doesn't work. In fec_read_bufs we store data into the variable
"fio->bufs", but fio bufs is shared between recursive invocations, if
"verity_hash_for_block" invoked correction recursively, it would
overwrite partially filled fio->bufs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: add VLAN id validation before using
Currently, the VLAN id may be used without validation when
receive a VLAN configuration mailbox from VF. The length of
vlan_del_fail_bmap is BITS_TO_LONGS(VLAN_N_VID). It may cause
out-of-bounds memory access once the VLAN id is bigger than
or equal to VLAN_N_VID.
Therefore, VLAN id needs to be checked to ensure it is within
the range of VLAN_N_VID. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtlwifi: 8192cu: fix tid out of range in rtl92cu_tx_fill_desc()
TID getting from ieee80211_get_tid() might be out of range of array size
of sta_entry->tids[], so check TID is less than MAX_TID_COUNT. Othwerwise,
UBSAN warn:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192cu/trx.c:514:30
index 10 is out of range for type 'rtl_tid_data [9]' |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Improper access control in Windows Update Stack allows an authorized attacker to perform tampering locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows IKE Extension allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in HID class driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
