| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
flow_dissector: do not dissect PPPoE PFC frames
RFC 2516 Section 7 states that Protocol Field Compression (PFC) is NOT
RECOMMENDED for PPPoE. In practice, pppd does not support negotiating
PFC for PPPoE sessions, and the flow dissector driver has assumed an
uncompressed frame until the blamed commit.
During the review process of that commit [1], support for PFC is
suggested. However, having a compressed (1-byte) protocol field means
the subsequent PPP payload is shifted by one byte, causing 4-byte
misalignment for the network header and an unaligned access exception
on some architectures.
The exception can be reproduced by sending a PPPoE PFC frame to an
ethernet interface of a MIPS board, with RPS enabled, even if no PPPoE
session is active on that interface:
$ 0 : 00000000 80c40000 00000000 85144817
$ 4 : 00000008 00000100 80a75758 81dc9bb8
$ 8 : 00000010 8087ae2c 0000003d 00000000
$12 : 000000e0 00000039 00000000 00000000
$16 : 85043240 80a75758 81dc9bb8 00006488
$20 : 0000002f 00000007 85144810 80a70000
$24 : 81d1bda0 00000000
$28 : 81dc8000 81dc9aa8 00000000 805ead08
Hi : 00009d51
Lo : 2163358a
epc : 805e91f0 __skb_flow_dissect+0x1b0/0x1b50
ra : 805ead08 __skb_get_hash_net+0x74/0x12c
Status: 11000403 KERNEL EXL IE
Cause : 40800010 (ExcCode 04)
BadVA : 85144817
PrId : 0001992f (MIPS 1004Kc)
Call Trace:
[<805e91f0>] __skb_flow_dissect+0x1b0/0x1b50
[<805ead08>] __skb_get_hash_net+0x74/0x12c
[<805ef330>] get_rps_cpu+0x1b8/0x3fc
[<805fca70>] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x324/0x364
[<805fd120>] napi_complete_done+0x68/0x2a4
[<8058de5c>] mtk_napi_rx+0x228/0xfec
[<805fd398>] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1c4
[<805fd754>] napi_threaded_poll_loop+0x234/0x29c
[<805fd848>] napi_threaded_poll+0x8c/0xb0
[<80053544>] kthread+0x104/0x12c
[<80002bd8>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c
Code: 02d51821 1060045b 00000000 <8c640000> 3084000f 2c820005 144001a2 00042080 8e220000
To reduce the attack surface and maintain performance, do not process
PPPoE PFC frames.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630231016.GA392@debian.home |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: avoid recursive nvmet-wq flush in nvmet_ctrl_free
nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work() runs on nvmet-wq and can drop the
final controller reference through nvmet_cq_put(). If that triggers
nvmet_ctrl_free(), the teardown path flushes ctrl->async_event_work on
the same nvmet-wq.
Call chain:
nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue()
kref_put(&queue->kref, nvmet_tcp_release_queue)
nvmet_tcp_release_queue()
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &queue->release_work) <--- nvmet_wq
process_one_work()
nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work()
nvmet_cq_put(&queue->nvme_cq)
nvmet_cq_destroy()
nvmet_ctrl_put(cq->ctrl)
nvmet_ctrl_free()
flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work) <--- nvmet_wq
Previously Scheduled by :-
nvmet_add_async_event
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work);
This trips lockdep with a possible recursive locking warning.
[ 5223.015876] run blktests nvme/003 at 2026-04-07 20:53:55
[ 5223.061801] loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 2097152
[ 5223.072206] nvmet: adding nsid 1 to subsystem blktests-subsystem-1
[ 5223.088368] nvmet_tcp: enabling port 0 (127.0.0.1:4420)
[ 5223.126086] nvmet: Created discovery controller 1 for subsystem nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery for NQN nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:0f01fb42-9f7f-4856-b0b3-51e60b8de349.
[ 5223.128453] nvme nvme1: new ctrl: NQN "nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery", addr 127.0.0.1:4420, hostnqn: nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:0f01fb42-9f7f-4856-b0b3-51e60b8de349
[ 5233.199447] nvme nvme1: Removing ctrl: NQN "nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery"
[ 5233.227718] ============================================
[ 5233.231283] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 5233.234696] 7.0.0-rc3nvme+ #20 Tainted: G O N
[ 5233.238434] --------------------------------------------
[ 5233.241852] kworker/u192:6/2413 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 5233.245429] ffff888111632548 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90
[ 5233.251438]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 5233.255254] ffff888111632548 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x5cc/0x6e0
[ 5233.261125]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 5233.265333] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 5233.269217] CPU0
[ 5233.270795] ----
[ 5233.272436] lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq);
[ 5233.275241] lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq);
[ 5233.278020]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 5233.281793] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 5233.286195] 3 locks held by kworker/u192:6/2413:
[ 5233.289192] #0: ffff888111632548 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x5cc/0x6e0
[ 5233.294569] #1: ffffc9000e2a7e40 ((work_completion)(&queue->release_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c5/0x6e0
[ 5233.300128] #2: ffffffff82d7dc40 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0x62/0x530
[ 5233.304290]
stack backtrace:
[ 5233.306520] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2413 Comm: kworker/u192:6 Tainted: G O N 7.0.0-rc3nvme+ #20 PREEMPT(full)
[ 5233.306524] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [N]=TEST
[ 5233.306525] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 5233.306527] Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work [nvmet_tcp]
[ 5233.306532] Call Trace:
[ 5233.306534] <TASK>
[ 5233.306536] dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xb0
[ 5233.306552] print_deadlock_bug+0x225/0x2f0
[ 5233.306556] __lock_acquire+0x13f0/0x2290
[ 5233.306563] lock_acquire+0xd0/0x300
[ 5233.306565] ? touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90
[ 5233.306571] ? __flush_work+0x20b/0x530
[ 5233.306573] ? touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90
[ 5233.306577] touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x3b/0x90
[ 5233.306580] ? touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90
[ 52
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume size
rock_continue() reads rs->cont_extent verbatim from the Rock Ridge CE
record and passes it to sb_bread() without checking that the block
number is within the mounted ISO 9660 volume. commit e595447e177b
("[PATCH] rock.c: handle corrupted directories") added cont_offset
and cont_size rejection for the CE continuation but did not validate
the extent block number itself. commit f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix
infinite looping over CE entries") later capped the CE chain length
at RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES = 32 but again left the block number unchecked.
With a crafted ISO mounted via udisks2 (desktop optical auto-mount)
or via CAP_SYS_ADMIN mount, rs->cont_extent can therefore point at
an out-of-range block or at blocks belonging to an adjacent
filesystem on the same block device. sb_bread() on an out-of-range
block returns NULL cleanly via the block layer EIO path, so there
is no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent-
filesystem data, the CE buffer is parsed as Rock Ridge records and
only the text of SL sub-records reaches userspace through
readlink(), which makes the info-leak channel narrow and difficult
to exploit; still, rejecting the malformed CE outright matches the
rejection shape already present in the same function for
cont_offset and cont_size.
Add an ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones bounds check to rock_continue() next
to the existing offset/size rejection, printing the same
corrupted-directory-entry notice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: fix a buffer overflow in ioctl processing
Tony Asleson (using Claude) found a buffer overflow in dm-ioctl in the
function retrieve_status:
1. The code in retrieve_status checks that the output string fits into
the output buffer and writes the output string there
2. Then, the code aligns the "outptr" variable to the next 8-byte
boundary:
outptr = align_ptr(outptr);
3. The alignment doesn't check overflow, so outptr could point past the
buffer end
4. The "for" loop is iterated again, it executes:
remaining = len - (outptr - outbuf);
5. If "outptr" points past "outbuf + len", the arithmetics wraps around
and the variable "remaining" contains unusually high number
6. With "remaining" being high, the code writes more data past the end of
the buffer
Luckily, this bug has no security implications because:
1. Only root can issue device mapper ioctls
2. The commonly used libraries that communicate with device mapper
(libdevmapper and devicemapper-rs) use buffer size that is aligned to
8 bytes - thus, "outptr = align_ptr(outptr)" can't overshoot the input
buffer and the bug can't happen accidentally |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions in close and init paths
Vulnerabilities leading to Use-After-Free (UAF) and Null Pointer
Dereference (NPD) conditions were observed in the lifecycle management
of hci_uart.
The primary issue arises because the workqueues (init_ready and
write_work) are only flushed/cancelled if the HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
flag is set during TTY close. If a hangup occurs before setup completes,
hci_uart_tty_close() skips the teardown of these workqueues and
proceeds to free the `hu` struct. When the scheduled work executes
later, it blindly dereferences the freed `hu` struct.
Furthermore, several data races and UAFs were identified in the teardown
sequence:
1. Calling hci_uart_flush() from hci_uart_close() without effectively
disabling write_work causes a race condition where both can concurrently
double-free hu->tx_skb. This happens because protocol timers can
concurrently invoke hci_uart_tx_wakeup() and requeue write_work.
2. Calling hci_free_dev(hdev) before hu->proto->close(hu) causes a UAF
when vendor specific protocol close callbacks dereference hu->hdev.
3. In the initialization error paths, failing to take the proto_lock
write lock before clearing PROTO_READY leads to races with active
readers. Additionally, hci_uart_tty_receive() accesses hu->hdev
outside the read lock, leading to UAFs if the initialization error
path frees hdev concurrently.
Fix these synchronization and lifecycle issues by:
1. Re-ordering hci_uart_tty_close() to clear HCI_UART_PROTO_READY first,
followed immediately by a cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work). Clearing
the flag locks out concurrent protocol timers from successfully invoking
hci_uart_tx_wakeup(), effectively rendering the cancellation permanent
and preventing the tx_skb double-free.
2. Note: Clearing PROTO_READY early causes hci_uart_close() to skip
hu->proto->flush(). This is perfectly safe in the tty_close path
because hu->proto->close() executes shortly after, which intrinsically
purges all protocol SKB queues and tears down the state.
3. Relocating hu->proto->close(hu) strictly prior to hci_free_dev(hdev)
across all close and error paths to prevent vendor-level UAFs.
4. Moving the hdev->stat.byte_rx increment in hci_uart_tty_receive()
inside the proto_lock read-side critical section to safely synchronize
with device unregistration.
5. Adding cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work) to hci_uart_close() to safely
flush the workqueue before hci_uart_flush() is invoked via the HCI core.
6. Utilizing cancel_work_sync() instead of disable_work_sync() across
all paths to prevent permanently breaking user-space retry capabilities. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject userspace cifs.spnego descriptions
cifs.spnego key descriptions contain authority-bearing fields such as
pid, uid, creduid, and upcall_target that cifs.upcall treats as
kernel-originating inputs. However, userspace can also create keys of
this type through request_key(2) or add_key(2), allowing those fields to
be supplied without CIFS origin.
Only accept cifs.spnego descriptions while CIFS is using its private
spnego_cred to request the key. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: fix buffer size clamping order
In vsock_update_buffer_size(), the buffer size was being clamped to the
maximum first, and then to the minimum. If a user sets a minimum buffer
size larger than the maximum, the minimum check overrides the maximum
check, inverting the constraint.
This breaks the intended socket memory boundaries by allowing the
vsk->buffer_size to grow beyond the configured vsk->buffer_max_size.
Fix this by checking the minimum first, and then the maximum. This
ensures the buffer size never exceeds the buffer_max_size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: revalidate list cursor after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() in SCTP_SENDALL
The SCTP_SENDALL path in sctp_sendmsg() iterates ep->asocs with
list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next entry in @tmp before
the loop body runs. The body calls sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(), which may
drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf().
While the lock is dropped, another thread can SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF the
association cached in @tmp, migrating it to a new endpoint via
sctp_sock_migrate() (list_del_init() + list_add_tail() to
newep->asocs), and optionally close the new socket which frees the
association via kfree_rcu(). The cached @tmp can also be freed by a
network ABORT for that association, processed in softirq while the
lock is dropped.
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() revalidates @asoc (the current entry) on re-lock
via the "sk != asoc->base.sk" and "asoc->base.dead" checks, but nothing
revalidates @tmp. After a successful return, the iterator advances to
the stale @tmp, yielding either a use-after-free (if the peeled socket
was closed) or a list-walk onto the new endpoint's list head (type
confusion of &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *).
Both are reachable from CapEff=0; the type-confusion path gives
controlled indirect call via the outqueue.sched->init_sid pointer.
Fix by re-deriving @tmp from @asoc after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc()
returns. @asoc is known to still be on ep->asocs at that point: the
only callers that list_del an association from ep->asocs are
sctp_association_free() (which sets asoc->base.dead) and
sctp_assoc_migrate() (which changes asoc->base.sk), and
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() checks both under the lock before any
successful return; a tripped check propagates as err < 0 and the loop
bails before the re-derive.
The SCTP_ABORT path in sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags() returns 0 and the
loop hits 'continue' before sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() is ever called, so
the @tmp cached by list_for_each_entry_safe() still covers the
lock-held free that ba59fb027307 ("sctp: walk the list of asoc
safely") was added for. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs()
drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() computes sub-sampled plane dimensions
using plain integer division:
unsigned int width = mode_cmd->width / (i ? info->hsub : 1);
unsigned int height = mode_cmd->height / (i ? info->vsub : 1);
However, the ioctl-level framebuffer_check() in drm_framebuffer.c uses
drm_format_info_plane_width/height() which round up dimensions via
DIV_ROUND_UP(). This inconsistency corrupts the subsequent GEM object
size check for certain pixel format and dimension combinations.
For example, with NV12 (vsub=2) and a 1-pixel-tall framebuffer the
GEM size validation path sees height=0 instead of height=1. The
expression (height - 1) then wraps to UINT_MAX as an unsigned int,
causing min_size to overflow and wrap back to a small value. A tiny
GEM object therefore passes the size guard, yet when the GPU accesses
the chroma plane it will read or write memory beyond the object's
bounds.
Fix by replacing the open-coded divisions with drm_format_info_plane_width()
and drm_format_info_plane_height(), which use DIV_ROUND_UP() and match
the calculation already used in framebuffer_check(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbcon: Avoid OOB font access if console rotation fails
Clear the font buffer if the reallocation during console rotation fails
in fbcon_rotate_font(). The putcs implementations for the rotated buffer
will return early in this case. See [1] for an example.
Currently, fbcon_rotate_font() keeps the old buffer, which is too small
for the rotated font. Printing to the rotated console with a high-enough
character code will overflow the font buffer.
v2:
- fix typos in commit message |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: spi-nor: debugfs: fix out-of-bounds read in spi_nor_params_show()
Sashiko noticed an out-of-bounds read [1].
In spi_nor_params_show(), the snor_f_names array is passed to
spi_nor_print_flags() using sizeof(snor_f_names).
Since snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof() returns the total
number of bytes occupied by the pointers
(element_count * sizeof(void *))
rather than the element count itself. On 64-bit systems, this makes the
passed length 8x larger than intended.
Inside spi_nor_print_flags(), the 'names_len' argument is used to
bounds-check the 'names' array access. An out-of-bounds read occurs
if a flag bit is set that exceeds the array's actual element count
but is within the inflated byte-size count.
Correct this by using ARRAY_SIZE() to pass the actual number of
string pointers in the array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential use-after-free issue when stopping watchdog task
Watchdog task might end between send_sig() and kthread_stop() calls, what
results in the use-after-free issue. Fix this by increasing watchdog task
reference count before calling send_sig() and dropping it by switching to
kthread_stop_put(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: Add limits to event and receive message requests
The driver would just fetch events and receive messages until the
BMC said it was done. To avoid issues with BMCs that never say they are
done, add a limit of 10 fetches at a time.
In addition, an si interface has an attn state it can return from the
hardware which is supposed to cause a flag fetch to see if the driver
needs to fetch events or message or a few other things. If the attn
bit gets stuck, it's a similar problem. So allow messages in between
flag fetches so the driver itself doesn't get stuck.
This is a more general fix than the previous fix for the specific bad
BMC, but should fix the more general issue of a BMC that won't stop
saying it has data.
This has been there from the beginning of the driver. It's not a bug
per-se, but it is accounting for bugs in BMCs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/CPU/AMD: Prevent improper isolation of shared resources in Zen2's op cache
Make sure resources are not improperly shared in the op cache and
cause instruction corruption this way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exit: prevent preemption of oopsing TASK_DEAD task
When an already-exiting task oopses, make_task_dead() currently calls
do_task_dead() with preemption enabled. That is forbidden:
do_task_dead() calls __schedule(), which has a comment saying "WARNING:
must be called with preemption disabled!".
If an oopsing task is preempted in do_task_dead(), between becoming
TASK_DEAD and entering the scheduler explicitly, bad things happen:
finish_task_switch() assumes that once the scheduler has switched away
from a TASK_DEAD task, the task can never run again and its stack is no
longer needed; but that assumption apparently doesn't hold if the dead
task was preempted (the SM_PREEMPT case).
This means that the scheduler ends up repeatedly dropping references on
the dead task's stack, which can lead to use-after-free or double-free
of the entire task stack; in other words, two tasks can end up running
on the same stack, resulting in various kinds of memory corruption.
(This does not just affect "recursively oopsing" tasks; it is enough to
oops once during task exit, for example in a file_operations::release
handler) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: b43legacy: enforce bounds check on firmware key index in RX path
Same fix as b43: the firmware-controlled key index in b43legacy_rx()
can exceed dev->max_nr_keys. The existing B43legacy_WARN_ON is
non-enforcing in production builds, allowing an out-of-bounds read of
dev->key[].
Make the check enforcing by dropping the frame for invalid indices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fanotify: fix false positive on permission events
fsnotify_get_mark_safe() may return false for a mark on an unrelated group,
which results in bypassing the permission check.
Fix by skipping over detached marks that are not in the current group. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show()
target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a
256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that
buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which
can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN
names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only
guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will
read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs
reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic()
will be triggered.
Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length
check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the
target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so
resolve that here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix a potential clc buffer length underflow
The buf_len is used to limit the iterations for retrieving the country
power setting and may underflow under certain conditions due to changes
in the power table in CLC.
This underflow leads to an almost infinite loop or an invalid power
setting resulting in driver initialization failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: remove station if connection prep fails
If connection preparation fails for MLO connections, then the
interface is completely reset to non-MLD. In this case, we must
not keep the station since it's related to the link of the vif
being removed. Delete an existing station. Any "new_sta" is
already being removed, so that doesn't need changes.
This fixes a use-after-free/double-free in debugfs if that's
enabled, because a vif going from MLD (and to MLD, but that's
not relevant here) recreates its entire debugfs. |
